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Abstract
This essay examines Qoheleth’s Catalogue of the Times poem in Eccl 3:2–8. I argue
that the two most common scholarly interpretations of the poem’s overall meaning fail
to sufficiently account for its literary context and that an underdeveloped alternative
reading is to be preferred. When we read the poem in light of two other closely related
passages, 1:4–11 and 3:9–15, it becomes clear that a poem ostensibly about “time” is
much less concerned with “timing” than is typically thought, but instead signifies
Qoheleth’s frustration with the inevitable equilibrating tendency embedded into every
human task.
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Introduction

This essay examines Qoheleth’s Catalogue of the Times poem in Eccl 3:2–8.
I argue that the two most common scholarly interpretations of the poem’s
overall meaning fail to sufficiently account for its literary context and that an
underdeveloped alternative reading is to be preferred. When we read the poem
in light of two other closely related passages, 1:4–11 and 3:9–15, it becomes clear
that a poem ostensibly about “time” is much less concerned with “timing” than

is typically thought, but instead signifies Qoheleth’s frustration with the inevitable equilibrating tendency embedded into every human task. Before providing further context for my interpretation, I will provide a translation of the
poem:
(1) For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under
heaven:
(2) A time to be born1 and a time to die,
A time to plant and a time to uproot what is planted,
(3) A time to kill and a time to heal,
A time to tear down and a time to build up,
(4) A time to cry and a time to laugh,
A time for mourning and a time for dancing,
(5) A time to throw stones, and a time to gather stones,
A time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing,
(6) A time to seek and a time to lose,
A time to keep and a time to throw away,
(7) A time to tear and a time to sew,
A time to be silent and a time to speak,
(8) A time to love and a time to hate,
A time of war and a time of peace.
Eccl 3:1–8

1.1
The “Proper Times” Reading of Eccl 3:2–8
Scholars have long debated the meaning of Qoheleth’s famous poem. One
common interpretation has been to read the poem as referring to the proper,
appropriate, or opportune time at which to act.2 There is a rightness to an
1 A minority of commentators, such as Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15,” 56–57; Seow,
Ecclesiastes, 160; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 28–29; Kamano, Cosmology and Character, 83, have
argued that  ָל ֶל ֶדתas a qal infinitive construct must be translated in the active sense, “to
give birth,” rather than the passive, “to be born.” But the vast majority of commentators find
the passive sense grammatically acceptable since the infinitive construct form is “neutral
in respect of voice, namely the active form can be passive in force” (Joüon-Maraoka §124s,
citing Gen 4:13; 6:20; Josh 2:5; 11:19; Esth 7:4; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 237, additionally cites
Deut 31:17; Jer 25:34; Hos 9:11), and the passive sense is preferable here in light of the parallel
with  ָלמוּת. Defenders of the active sense often prioritize the parallel with  ָל ַט ַעת, “to plant,”
but all twenty-eight activities in the poem are human activities, and it would be rather odd
to expect a person to “be planted,” thus the parallel is of little value in determining the sense
of  ָל ֶל ֶדת.
2 Scholars who advocate this interpretation include Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 50–51, 126–131;
Galling, “Das Rätsel”; idem, “Der Prediger,” 93–95; Zimmerli, “Das Buch,” 167–175; Loretz,
Qohelet, 252; Fox, Rereading, 191–214 (which is a reprint of Fox, “Time”); Whybray, Ecclesiastes
(OTG), 36–37; Perdue, Wisdom & Creation, 216–217; Schultz, “Sense of Timing”; Bundvad,
Time, 90–109; Köhlmoos, Kohelet, 116.

action when done at a particular time, and the wise person will be cognizant
of that timing and so choose to act appropriately when the time comes. Thus
the emphasis falls upon human agency (in both recognizing and choosing to
act) and upon the fact that some times are better than others with respect to
a given activity. According to this view, Qoheleth’s subsequent comments on
the poem in 3:9–15 convey his frustration over humanity’s inability to know the
times and thus to find success in this way.3
This interpretation certainly has its strengths. First, it is quite reasonable to
expect that a poem which contains twenty-eight occurrences of the word ֵעת
(“time”) would be about timing. Moreover, the infinitive constructs prefixed
by –  לseem naturally, both in Hebrew and in their English translations, to convey a sense of what one ought “to do” (just as in English phrases such as “time
to wake up!” or “time to go!”). An intuitive reading of the poem on its own,
apart from its context in Qoheleth, seems to give credence to this conclusion.4
Second, there are other texts from the wisdom corpus that similarly indicate
the rightness or wrongness of a certain action as contingent upon its timeliness (Prov 15:23; Sir 1:23–24; 4:20, 23; 20:7, 20). Third, 3:11a could be read as
good support for this understanding: that God “makes everything beautiful in
its time” would mean that things go well (“beautifully,” NET) for the one undertaking an action when it is performed “in its [proper] time.”
On the other hand, there are evident problems facing this reading. The first
problem I will mention involves part of the poem’s content, but the others
relate to the poem’s awkward fit (given this reading) with Qoheleth’s commentary in 3:9–15. First, the opening line of v. 2 discloses that there is “a time to be
born, and a time to die.” As many have noted, if the point of the poem were to
emphasize human agency and ethical duty, it would be strange to begin with
a pair of activities ostensibly beyond human control. Michael Fox acknowledges that this initial pair cannot be chosen but posits that the remainder of

3 See Fox, Rereading, 206; Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC), 73; Galling, “Der Prediger,” 95.
4 It is for this reason that several scholars suggest that the original poem, as a free-floating
entity, did carry the traditional “proper times” sense, but that it was picked up by Qoheleth
who then utilized it for different purposes, e.g., Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 31; Köhlmoos, Kohelet,
116; Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC), 67, 70; Wright, “For Everything,” 327; Fischer, Skepsis, 224.
It is not crucial, for our purposes, to stake a claim on the question as to whether Qoheleth
originally penned the poem or whether he is simply citing an inherited piece (and the question becomes even more hermeneutically complex for scholars who think that “Qoheleth” is
a fictional character constructed by the author of Ecclesiastes). I am more inclined toward
the view that Qoheleth penned it, but my argument will not depend on it, since if he did not
originally write the poem, the important question is how he is interpreting it and conveying
it to his audience—what he considers its message to be in its contribution to his work as
a whole.

the poem’s activities can be.5 Yet this only restates the problem, as it seems
unlikely that Qoheleth would begin the poem with a pair of exceptions to
the poem’s general message. It is more sensible to presume the author would
commence the poem with a pair of actions that sum up (or at least accurately
reflect) the intent of the poem as a whole, especially in light of the poem’s
highly parallel structure.
Second, if the poem’s aim is indeed to exhort its readers to choose to act
at the “proper time,” this implies that the poem is in some way a celebration
of human agency. Yet slightly after the poem in 3:14, it is precisely the role of
human agency within God’s scheme that Qoheleth denies: “Whatever God
does endures forever; there is no adding to it, nor is there any subtracting from
it. God has acted […].” Third, if the focus of the poem concerns humanity’s
ability to choose the correct time for action, Qoheleth’s pessimistic question
immediately following the poem in 3:9 strikes the reader as counterintuitive.
Why should the call to act at an opportune time lead to the conclusion that
there is no lasting gain? To make sense of 3:9, the “proper times” view must
import the unstated premise that people lack knowledge of the poem’s times
or opportunities and for that reason fail to take advantage of them, resulting
in the exasperated question of v. 9, “What gain?” But the verse does not itself
state this. A reading in which v. 9 constitutes a more direct, fitting response to
the poem in 3:2–8 is to be preferred. Fourth, Qoheleth in 3:17 links back to the
diction of 3:1–8, yet the one activity “there is a time for” in this verse is only an
act of God—his judgment—not one possible for humans to choose.
1.2
The Common Determinist Reading of Eccl 3:2–8
Many scholars have argued for an entirely different reading of the poem, what
may be called the determinist reading. They contend that Qoheleth’s reference
to the times is not signifying the right time for a human to act, with the correlating implication that the person might well miss the opportunity. The poem
is not prescribing the proper times at which the wise person should choose to
act, but is instead describing the fact that God has ordained all of the times at
which the activities reflected in the poem will occur.6 Scholars do not always
5 See Fox, Rereading, 201–209.
6 Commentators defending one variant or another of a determinist reading for the passage
include Rudman, Determinism, 40–44, 83–98; idem, “Determinism and Anti-Determinism,”
97–106; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 39; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 227–282; Enns, Ecclesiastes, 51–56;
Seow, Ecclesiastes, 158–174; Fox, Contradictions, 190–196 (previous to Fox’s change of mind;
see n. 11); Gordis, Koheleth, 228–234; von Rad, Wisdom, 228–230; 263–265; Hengel, Judaism,
1:121; Zimmerli, “Wisdom”; Scott, Ecclesiastes, 220–221; Jastrow, Gentle Cynic, 141; Wildeboer,
“Der Prediger,” 131–134; Wright, Koheleth, 338–345; Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 254–264; Ginsburg,
Coheleth, 303–314. Crenshaw, “Eternal Gospel,” regards the original poem as a piece of

convey this determinism in the same terms, but on the stronger articulations
of this reading, “time” ( ) ֵעתrefers to “a time for human action which is predetermined by God, and in accordance with which human beings must act.”7 We
are in the realm, then, not of ethical duty, but metaphysical necessity.
There are several attractive features to the determinist reading of 3:2–8 over
against the “proper times” reading. First, the determinist reading makes much
better sense of the commentary section immediately following the passage,
that of 3:9–15, where Qoheleth provides us with the lens through which he is
reading the poem. In particular, Qoheleth’s lamenting question in 3:9 could follow naturally from the idea that all human behavior is preprogrammed, much
more naturally than it follows an admonition for readers to act at the proper
time.8 Further, 3:14 represents, at minimum, a strong proclamation of God’s
sovereignty and the inability for humans to change his plans, thus aligning
nicely with the determinist reading. Finally, as already mentioned, Qoheleth
in 3:17 links God’s judgment to the phrase from 3:1, “(there is) a time for every
matter”—perhaps implying that the phrase has been more closely tied to
divine rather than human action all along.
The determinist view also confronts its own obstacles, however. The primary problem is that this view sometimes assumes a brand of determinism
that is far more particular than Qoheleth’s words necessitate. It is not only that
God is intervening in human affairs in real-time; it is also the case, as mentioned above, that all human actions are foreordained by God in advance, such
that humans will necessarily act in accordance with the predetermined divine
will at the moment established for them to do so. This is, at least, what several
scholars claim. For instance, Morris Jastrow writes:
The happenings of this world are preordained by God and take place in
the order and at the time determined by the great Power who governs
all things […]. The time when a man is to be born is fixed as is the time
of his death (3:2)—fixed as definitely as the time for sewing seeds and
wisdom instruction concerning the right time, but which “in its present setting cannot be an
affirmation” of this. Rather, taken up by Qoheleth it “laments the pre-determined monotony
of all human affairs” (34–35). Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15,” offers an interesting variation in that he takes 3:1–8 to be Qoheleth’s quotation of an earlier “Stoicized Jew” to which
Qoheleth then responds critically. Machinist, “Fate,” also emphasizes determinism (and
“fate”) in Qoheleth, but without specific reference to 3:2–8.
7 Rudman, Determinism, 200. Additional scholars representing this view will be provided
below.
8 E.g., Wright, Koheleth, 188, draws such a connection: “Times of war and peace, though apparently brought about by the exercise of man’s free action (which is not denied), are still under
the control of the Most High. Man, however, has no profit in all his labour, for he has no
certain power to regulate his own destiny.”

for pulling up the ripened plant. If everything is preordained, it is idle to
make the effort to change things.9
Otto Kaiser likewise comments, “These times are strictly determined […]
there are preordained, pre-qualified times for everything we may undertake.”10
Others express Qoheleth’s views in the same manner.11
However, it appears that these scholars have imputed to Qoheleth a version
of determinism derived not from the text of Qoheleth itself but from other,
mostly later ancient Jewish texts, as well as theological and philosophical traditions. Despite the linkage between the two claimed by Gerhard von Rad,12
there is nothing in Qoheleth of the sort of determinism one finds in much of
the Jewish apocalyptic literature or the sectarian literature of Qumran. This
strict form of determinism found in these latter corpuses is indeed marked by
explicit statements that God exercises complete control over the thoughts and
deeds of individuals and has even planned these since before the creation of
the world.13 Thus, while the determinism of the Qumran community may well
match these scholars’ descriptions, it is much less clear in the case of Qoheleth.

9
10
11

12
13

Jastrow, Gentle Cynic, 141.
Kaiser, “Fate,” 7.
To those already provided we could add Lauha, Kohelet, 63–64, 68; Scott, Ecclesiastes, 198,
226, 233; Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 254–255. Rudman, Determinism, 59 also argues for a hard
determinism in the book, referring to “the list of predetermined actions and emotions in
3.1–8” and consistently positing that for Qoheleth “all human business is predetermined
by God” (54, cf. 89, 126, 128, 131, 138, 149, etc.). Fox, Rereading, 197, writes: “If by ‘et Qohelet
means a unique moment on the time-line, he is assuming a strong determinism: every act
and event is assigned in advance a moment at which it will occur.” Fox acknowledges that
that was his view in his Contradictions monograph. In Rereading, however, Fox now sees
“a less rigid sort of determinism” (197) in line with the proper times view described earlier,
since “the timing of most of the actions in the Catalogue is to some degree in man’s control” (201).
See von Rad, Wisdom, 263–283.
E.g., “From the God of Knowledge comes all that is and all that happens. Before ever they
existed he established their whole design and when, as ordained for them, they come into
being, it is in accord with his glorious design that they accomplish their task, and there
is no changing” (1QS 3.15–16); “Surely apart from you the way cannot be perfected, nor
can anything be done unless it please you. You teach all knowledge and all that shall be,
by your will shall it come to pass” (1QS 11.16–18); cf. 1QHa 18:7–11; 4Q417 I, 1.10–12; 4Q180
I 2–3. See the discussion in Merrill, Qumran and Predestination; Stauber, “Determinism”;
Popovic, “Apocalyptic Determinism.” Such clear-eyed determinism is also manifest even
in some non-apocalyptic Jewish works, such as Judith: “All that happened then, and
all that happened before and after, was your work. What is now and what is yet to be,
you have planned; and what you have planned has come to pass. The things you have

A second problem for many determinist interpretations of 3:2–8 (and 3:1–15)
is that they fail to account for the important contribution of 3:15, the culminating verse of the section yet one that is often swept to the side in discussions
about determinism in Qoheleth. Typically, talk of God’s pre-determination or
pre-ordination of events assumes a linear timeline, with the deity’s causations
standing at the front end of a domino-like series of events (A, B, C, etc.). Yet
the thought of time’s cyclicality which Qoheleth broaches in 3:15—itself alluding back to 1:9—jars against the linear-time metaphysic which determinist
readings frequently presume. This will be taken up in greater detail later on,
but the point for now is that scholars have not sufficiently reckoned with the
tension between (a) the determinist readings of the book in which distinct
events are thought to be plotted out in advance along a progressive historical
time-line, and (b) the book’s prominent theme of cyclicality, which places all
human activity under a shroud of repetition and denies any sense of linear
movement or historical progress. These are two very different notions, and I will
argue that only the latter is of Qoheleth. Nonetheless, a sense of “determinism” in
the book can be maintained if it is reoriented to comport with the book’s theme
of cyclicality.
1.3

An Alternative Reading of Eccl 3:2–8: Cyclical, Anthropological
Determinism
To these two predominant views of the times poem, then, I wish to propose a
third alternative, what I will (somewhat cumbersomely) call cyclical, anthropological determinism.14 This phrase is meant to highlight three closely interrelated aspects of Qoheleth’s worldview communicated by use of the poem, in
conjunction with other passages. These we may summarize in reverse order:
(a) God has determined, or, caused to bring about, the essential nature of the
world and human existence. Yet, in distinction from the common determinist view, the sense of “determine” here refers not to the preordination
and real-time intervention of unique, individual events plotted along historical time, but instead refers to the establishment of a broad framework
or structure within which human existence occurs.15

14

15

foreordained present themselves and say, ‘We are here.’ All your ways are prepared beforehand.” (Jdt 9:5–6).
Clearly, the latter of these implies I am not in complete disagreement with the “determinist” view just represented. But I think any reference to determinism in Qoheleth demands
much qualification; we need to take a fresh look at what kind of determinism the book
does or does not espouse.
On this point I find much kinship with Clines, “Predestination,” 533–534: “Predestination
for Ecclesiastes does not mean that the particular acts of individuals are fixed in advance

(b) This broad framework is anthropological. It concerns what humans can
and cannot do, both their capacities and limitations, not with respect
to their “free will” in some specific instance but with respect to the very
structure of their existence as a whole and the “task” assigned to them by
the deity. Qoheleth uses the controlling metaphor of a “business,” with its
employer and employed, in order to explicate this aspect of the divinehuman relationship.
(c) This anthropological structure which God has set in place is cyclical.
Human activities oscillate ceaselessly (reflecting nature itself) and thus
the events of the present and future are nothing but reiterations of what
has already happened in the past.16
This three-fold reality is one which Qoheleth finds deeply troubling. Beyond
describing it, Qoheleth also makes clear its negative value for human beings.
The remainder of my essay will defend this tripartite notion in Qoheleth by
examining Eccl 1:4–11 and 3:9–15, along with their significance for interpreting
the poem in 3:2–8.

2

Cyclicality in Eccl 1:4–11

The first step toward this third reading of 3:2–8 begins with a point that various
commentators have acknowledged but insufficiently developed—namely, the
strong similarities between the poem of 3:2–8 and that of 1:4–11.17 We need to

16

17

by God, but rather that the possibilities open to humans and the value of human activities are settled in advance by the framework of God’s created order, which terminates
everything with human death”—although I will want to add more to the framework than
that it terminates in death.
Since the word “cyclical” has been used in various ways, it is important to be clear that
by using the term I do not intend to refer to a certain order in which a series of different
events should occur. I agree with Fox, Rereading, 200, when he writes: “Qohelet does not
here speak of time as a cycle in which crying follows laughing, which follows crying, and
so on ad infinitum. Several ‘crying times’ may follow in succession before it is right to
laugh. Rather, he describes a binary pairing of opposed event-types as a structural property
of reality, not as a temporal sequence” (emphasis added). If the various spheres of reality are structured in binary pairs then both sides will eventually take place, and if we
are dealing with only two constituents, then this is still alternation in a broader sense.
In other words, a movement such as A-A-A-B-B-A-B-B-B is reducible to A-B-A-B, and is
cyclical in that sense. “Cyclical,” then, is still a helpful word to use for the phenomenon
in question, because it conveys a notion of repetition in which reiterations take place
through an oscillatory back-and-forth movement, as in, for instance, the oscillating cycles
of power within a two-party political system.
See, e.g., Dell, “Cycle,” 187; Loader, Polar Structures, 90. Others are listed in n. 30 below.

discuss 1:4–11 in order to explore the theme of cyclicality as it appears there.
Once the presence of cyclicality becomes clear in 1:4–11, we will have more
reason to take notice of it in 3:1–8 and 3:9–15:
(4) A generation goes, and a generation comes,
but the earth remains forever the same.
(5) The sun rises, and the sun sets,
and hurrying back to its place, it rises from there again.
(6) Going to the south and circling back down to the north,
turning and turning goes the wind,
and upon its circuits the wind returns.
(7) All the streams go into the sea, but the sea is never filled.
To the very place from which the streams flow18 they return.19
18

19

MT ל־מקֹום ֶשׁ ַהנְּ ָח ִלים ה ְֹל ִכים ָשׁם
ְ ( ֶאlit. “to the place which the streams flow there”) should
be emended to ל־מקֹום ֶשׁ ַהנְּ ָח ִלים ה ְֹל ִכים ִמ ָשּׁם
ְ ( ֶאlit. “to the place which the streams flow
from there,” i.e., “to the place from which the streams flow”) on account of haplography
of the  מin  ִמ ָשּׁם. This is reasonable in light of the many surrounding occurrences of final
mem as well as the support for this reading found in Symmachus (εἰς τὸν τόπον ἀφ’ οὗ οἱ
ποταμοὶ πορεύονται) and the Vulgate (ad locum unde flumina reuertuntur), though it must
be noted that the latter probably depends upon the former. Several other contextual factors lend support to this reading over its primary alternative, “to the place to which the
streams flow”: (a) Though the Masoretic pointing aligns  ָשׁםwith the following ֵהם ָשׁ ִבים
 ָל ָל ֶכתand many scholars assume this reading,  ָשׁםshould be read as concluding the prior
phrase, ל־מקֹום ֶשׁ ַהנְּ ָח ִלים ה ְֹל ִכים
ְ  ֶא. A phrase involving a noun of place (or source), a relative pronoun ( ֲא ֶשׁרor ) ֶשׁ, and a verb of movement should normally be followed by a ָשׁם
which is suffixed by either- ִמ ָשּׁם( מ, “from there,” i.e., “from which,” e.g., Gen 3:23; 10:14;
24:5; Num 23:13; etc.) or the directional  ָשׁ ָמּה( ה, “to there,” i.e., “to which,” e.g., Gen 20:13;
Exod 21:13; Lev 18:3; etc.) in order to disambiguate the relative pronoun;  ָשׁםby itself is
insufficient when either a source or destination needs to be identified. Positing  ִמ ָשּׁםas
concluding the prior phrase thus solves the issue. (b) The employment of both ל־מקֹום
ְ ֶא
and  ָשׁםin 1:7 corresponds to the use of both terms in 1:5. In 1:5, ל־מקֹומֹו
ְ  ֶאrefers to the
sun’s movement back to its original starting point (from B back to A), and  ָשׁםindicates
the place from which the cyclical movement will begin again (“it rises there” implies “rises
from there,” not “rises to there”). According to the reading I am proposing, the same is true
in 1:7: ל־מקֹום
ְ  ֶאrefers to the streams’ movement back to their origin or source—not to the
sea—and  ָשׁםagain signifies that original location from which the water cycle renews, not
its polar opposite (the sea). (c) The complicated syntax of 1:7b seems rather superfluous
and devoid of new informational content if the meaning is merely that the streams keep
flowing into the sea, a point already established in 1:7a. Rather, the syntactical features—
particularly, the fronted prepositional ( ) ֶאלphrase with  ָמקֹום, the use of the relative  ֶשׁ,
the presence of ) ִמ ָשּׁם( ָשׁם, as well as the verb  שׁובand the particular construction ָל ָל ֶכת
+  שׁובwhich will be highlighted in the next footnote—all point to a more complex idea,
one of cyclical return.
There is a lack of consensus concerning the translation and sense of ( ָשׁם( ֵהם ָשׁ ִבים ָל ָל ֶכת.
Some (e.g., Schoors, Longman, Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Lohfink, Whybray, Plumptre,
Ellermeir) take  ָשׁ ִביםas referring to a return from the sea back to the streams’ source

(8) All words are weak,20 one is not able to speak.
An eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor is an ear filled with hearing.

20

(usually coupled with an additional reference to the cycle starting again at this source,
due to ) ָל ָל ֶכת, while others (e.g., Seow, Gordis, Weeks, Murphy, Krüger, Barton, McNeile,
Wright) take it to convey a unidirectional continuation of waters traversing from rivers
to sea. Those of the latter opinion usually add “again” to the translation, noting that שׁוב
coupled with an infinitive construct can mean “to do [X] again,” a sense found in eight of
the forty-two occurrences in classical Hebrew where the two are conjoined (Deut 24:4;
30:9; Isa 6:13; Ezek 8:17; Hos 11:9; Ps 104:9; Job 7:7; Ezra 9:14). But I will suggest a modification of the first view, modified in that I do not see  ָל ָל ֶכתas indicating an additional cycle
or movement beyond the “return” conveyed by  ָשׁ ִבים. Evidence in support of this reading
and against the unidirectional reading is that the exact construction used here— שׁובfollowed by  הלךin infinite construct—is an apparent idiom attested four times elsewhere
in classical Hebrew and in all cases can only refer to a “return” in the sense of “going back”
the way something came (i.e., returning from B back to A, after having gone from A to
B), rather than “going again” (i.e., repeatedly going from A to B). See Eccl 5:14; 1 Kgs 12:24;
13:17; 1QHa 26:15 [= 4Q427 VII 1.20]). This apparent idiom should take precedence over
the occasional sense of “to do again” just outlined. In none of these instances can the
meaning of the construction be, “go again” (in the sense of going from A to B multiple
times); it always refers to a “turning back” (go back to A from B, having originally come
from A). In light of these, it seems best to translate  ֵהם ָשׁ ִבים ָל ָל ֶכתas simply “they return”
(in the sense of turning back), instead of “they continue to go/flow.” The cited texts also
show that  ָל ָל ֶכתin the construction is essentially redundant and idiomatic, presumably
clarifying the sense of the preceding  שׁובas indeed a “backward” return. It is best left
untranslated if “return” is used, and it should not be rendered as implying an additional
purposive clause, “in order to go/flow” in Eccl 1:7. In sum, the verse alludes to a “going” and
a “turning back,” not an additional “going” beyond that double-sequence, nor a continual
“going” in the same direction. This latter half of the verse thus provides the reason for the
claim of 1:7a that “the sea is never filled”: no sooner do the streams arrive there than they
begin their trip back home.
 ַה ְדּ ָב ִרים יְ גֵ ִעיםis a difficult phrase in that (a)  ְד ָב ִריםmay mean either “things” or “words,”
and (b)  יְ גֵ ִעיםhas been taken as an adjective, “weary, tired,” or, with a causative sense,
“wearying, tiresome,” while still others regard it as a participle, “laboring, toiling.” Those
who translate  ַה ְדּ ָב ִריםas “things” do so on the assumption that it summarizes the content
of 1:4–7. But the reference to speech in the very next line ( ) ְל ַד ֵבּרimplies we are dealing
here with “words.” An often overlooked factor is the theme of the impotence (and futility) of words, which appears not only in 1:8b but throughout the book. We may note the
apparent parallels between, e.g., 1:8aβ (א־יוּכל ִאישׁ ְל ַד ֵבּר
ַ ֹ ל, “one is not able to speak”) and
6:10c (א־יוּכל ָל ִדין
ַ ֹ אָדם ל
ָ , “a person is not able to dispute”), as well as, more loosely, 1:8aα
(“All  ַה ְדּ ָב ִריםare weary”) and 6:11 (“where there are many  ְד ָב ִרים, futility only increases”).
Cf. also 5:3, 7; 10:14, which make the point that a “multiplication” of words is profitless.
All of this evidences a well-established theme in Qoheleth that words are powerless to
change the (often frustrating) circumstances in which human beings find themselves in
the world. This makes decent sense of 1:8a, if we can allow it to be slightly elliptical. I have
translated  יְ גֵ ִעיםas “weak” in light of the above and since it is a small semantic leap from
“weary” to “weak” (cf. instances of the verbal form in Eccl 10:15; Isa 40:28, 30, 31; 57:10;
Jer 45:3; Pss 6:6; 69:3; Lam 5:5).

(9) That which has been—it is what will be.
And that which has happened—it is what will happen.
And there is nothing new under the sun.
(10) Is there anything of which one can say—“Look here! This is new!”?
It already has been, in the ages which were before us.
(11) There is no remembrance of former people, nor of those who are yet
to exist.
There will be no remembrance of them, nor of those who will exist
later still.
Eccl 1:4–11

A particular conception of cyclicality consistently emerges from 1:4–11.
Beginning with 1:4, here Qoheleth does not say that “a generation comes and
a generation goes,” but the inverse: “a generation goes ( )ה ֵֹלְךand a generation
comes () ָּבא.” This inversion is one indication he is thinking cyclically: he specifically chooses to highlight the moment of the turn or transition, the passing
of the torch between two generations, one passing away and the other coming
to be.21 This focus sets the stage for what will follow, as Qoheleth draws upon
nature’s oscillatory movements in order to emphasize two qualities inherent to
the human experience: its cyclical and ateleological character.
Next, in 1:5 Qoheleth describes that from the phenomenological perspective, the sun rises in the east, then traverses to the opposite side of the sky, but
eventually circles back to the place where it began—“panting” (שֹׁואף
ֵ ) along
the way—and soon repeats the whole process over again. “Its place” () ְמקֹומֹו
here refers to its starting point, from which it rises again.22 The opening words
21
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A common understanding of 1:4 posits a contrast between the transient “generations”
( )דֹּורand the permanent “earth” () ֶא ֶרץ, where  ֶא ֶרץis understood literally, as the physical
terra firma upon which humans dwell. But Fox, “Qohelet 1:4,” has alternatively argued that
 ֶא ֶרץin v. 4 “does not mean the physical earth, but humanity as a whole” (cf. Gen 6:11; 11:1;
1 Kgs 2:2; Ps 33:8). Fox is followed by Seow, Ecclesiastes, 106; Enns, Ecclesiastes, 33, among
others. It would be odd for Qoheleth to emphasize the permanence of the physical earth
in 1:4b, at the very commencement of the book’s argument, since that emphasis recurs
nowhere else in the poem nor book at large. What seems more sensible in the context of
the poem is that Qoheleth is highlighting the same kind of “permanence” he has in mind
in 1:9–11, namely, the character of human experience as a cyclical phenomenon. Though
one generation replaces another, and the particulars change, ineluctable traits of human
being remain. Weeks, Ecclesiastes 1.1–5.6, 272, suggests that it is also quite possible that the
word can be used broadly enough to include both humans and their physical habitation,
just as with “the world” in English.
An interesting parallel is found in a Babylonian text, which highlights the ancients’ readily acknowledged ignorance as to how the sun returns to  ְמקֹומֹו:
“To unknown distant regions and for uncounted leagues

of v. 6 present an initial ambiguity concerning the subject of the participial
actions, “going to the south and turning back to the north,” but the vast majority of modern commentaries and translations rightly regard this as a somewhat crafty way to introduce the wind, rather than a continuation of the sun’s
movement in the sky.23 In this case, as with the sun, there is a traverse from one
point (from its starting point “to the south”), and then a return to its antipode
(“north”). The pair of repeated participles that follow, סֹובב ס ֵֹבב
ֵ , have often been
rendered, “circling, circling,” though a few commentators have expressed reservations.24 But the point is not so much that the wind is literally traveling in
circles. This phrase should be read through the initial use of  סבבin 1:6a, where
it refers to the “turning back” from a northward direction to a southward direction (cf. Qoheleth’s use of  סבבin 2:20 and 7:25 for “I turned”). In light of this, as
well as the parallel with the sun and streams (including the parallel use of שׁוב
in 1:7), it is not likely Qoheleth is imagining a geometric circle, but something
more like parallel tracks in which a 180-degree “U-turn” is undertaken in order
to bring back the object to its starting point (see figure below). The movement
envisioned is less like a hurricane’s swirl than a boomerang’s forward-and-back
reprise, and it is this “turning, (re)turning” that persists unhindered.25
In 1:7 Qoheleth describes that the streams, too, start at their source and then
traverse over to the sea, before finally turning back to the original source. The
repetition of this process, if not quite explicitly stated in this case, is certainly
implied. Hence the surprising fact that despite the constant movement of the
streams into the sea, “the sea is never filled.” What is going into it is always
coming out; its gains are always counterbalanced by losses.
In each of the four verses in 1:4–7, then, we have a set of opposite binaries
establishing an A-B structure:
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You press on, Šamaš, going by day and returning by night.
Among the Igigi there is no one who toils but you […].”
BWL, 128–129, lines 43–48
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 6, says “this translation is certain.” For a review of this verse in the
history of Jewish exegesis, see Japhet, “Goes to the South.”
See, e.g., Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 49.
Whether or not the north-south axis represented the most common wind-pattern experienced by Qoheleth, it was probably chosen as a compliment to the more obvious eastwest dichotomy already taken by the sun (see Seow, Ecclesiastes, 108).

generation
sun
wind
streams

A
goes
ה ֵֹלְך
rises
וְ זָ ַרח
south
ל־דּרֹום
ָ ֶא
sea
ל־היָּ ם
ַ ֶא

B
comes
ָבּא
sets
וּבא
ָ
north
ל־צפֹון
ָ ֶא
source
ל־מקֹום
ְ ֶא

With each pair of binaries, the point is essentially two-fold: (a) that the activity
or movement in each case repeatedly “travels” between the two binary poles,
oscillating back and forth; and, (b) as a result, the movement never arrives anywhere “new” (cf. 1:9–10). It merely continues traversing along already-trodden
ground (cf. v. 6, “circuits”), never arriving at something outside this familiar
schema, something which might constitute “gain” or “surplus” ()יִ ְתרֹון. Hence
the movement is confined to endless cycles, perpetual repetition.
All of this can stand on its own from 1:4–7, but a cyclical conception is all
the more confirmed once we read 1:9–11. Verse 9 is as clear and concise a statement of cyclical time as one is likely to find in the ancient world. The future is
identified with the past, foregoing any structure which might cultivate the possibility for newness. Yet, unlike many of Qoheleth’s contemporaries, Qoheleth’s
version of cyclical time is not a metaphysical theory per se, supposing that
every precise state of the universe will eventually repeat itself, and do so again
and again eternally. Rather, Qoheleth’s notion of cyclicality is abstracted up a
level from the world’s physical (or metaphysical) constituents, into the realm
of classifications, types, and archetypes. It is the same types of events and
activities that will recur ad infinitum.26 (Given that it is still a theory about
26

I concur with Fox, Rereading, 168: “The assertion that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’
cannot apply to events as specific, unique occurrences. World War II, the book of Qohelet,
the death of Lincoln—these had not happened before. But in some sense Qohelet would
regard their reality as inhering in their realizing of archetypes: war, book, assassination.
Only in that way can he deny their newness.” Cf. Jastrow, Gentle Cynic, 122–123: “The variations in the repetition do not affect essentials”; Frydrych, Under the Sun, 119: “The predictability of Qoheleth’s world happens on an abstract phenomenal level, pertaining to
issues such as birth and death, joy and sorrow, but does not extend to the lower detailed
level of specific human actions and their consequences.” That is why the theme of repetition and cycles does not contradict ideas prominent elsewhere in Qoheleth about life’s
unpredictable nature (e.g., 9:11–12; 11:1–6). The precise circumstances may be unknown

B

A

the way reality is structured, however, we may call Qoheleth’s idea a “quasimetaphysical” theory.)
The statement in 1:10 is an immediate practical application of the principle of cyclicality declared in 1:9. If someone thinks they can ever legitimately
exclaim, “Look! This is new!”—they are mistaken. Since whatever happens
now is categorically equivalent to what has happened before, there technically
can be no “new” thing—nothing which is unclassifiable into the already familiar categories. The fundamental aspects of human existence, just as the movements of the sun, wind, and waters, have already been well established. And
henceforth, “it is known what a human being is.” (6:10)
Qoheleth concludes the poem in 1:11 by denying proficiency to human
memory () ֵאין זִ ְכרֹון. While at first glance this may seem an outlier to his prior
discussion, a connection can be made when we consider that what humans
remember of their predecessors are the anomalies—those deeds which stand
out as “new” and unique from the unending stream of information. By drawing
up the lines to claim that there really are no new distinctions among human
behavior, Qoheleth has established a framework in which memory is powerless. The “new” feeds the cultural memory; where nothing is new, nothing
is remembered.
Seeing the theme of cyclical time in Qoheleth, and particularly in 1:4–11,
is certainly no novel proposal. Readers of the book have been discerning this
theme from the very earliest interpretations on record,27 and the great majority of commentators on this passage have taken it as describing cyclical realities to one degree or another.28 The fact that Qoheleth commences his book
with a lengthy poem about cyclicality implies that this is indeed an important,
even central, aspect of his philosophy. The entire poem, 1:4–11, serves as the
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and unpredictable, but the broader picture and patterns will only repeat themselves. Cf.,
too, Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 24: “Even the monotonous cycles of nature defy prediction—
that they will repeat is sure, but when and how remain obscure.”
See, e.g., the discussion in Augustine, Civ. 12,14.
Those who have particularly highlighted this theme in recent years include Dell, “Cycle,”
183–185; Whybray, “Ecclesiastes 1:5–7”; Carasik, “Qohelet’s Twists and Turns”; Perry,
Ecclesiastes, 55–57. On the other hand, the cyclical interpretation of 1:4–7 is challenged in
Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 46–53.

answer to Qoheleth’s opening question in 1:3, “What gain is there?” With its
depiction of well-worn cycles that fail to effect change, the poem clearly provides a negative answer.29 This is all the more confirmed by the way Qoheleth
picks up the discussion two verses later in 1:13, referring to the “bad business”
God has given humans, and that all that is done is hebel and striving after wind.
With this understanding of 1:4–11 in view, we may now turn to 3:1–15.

3

Reading Eccl 3:2–8 in Relation to 1:4–11

A strong case can be made for reading the Catalogue of the Times poem of
3:2–8 in light of the bipolar cycles theme of 1:4–11.30 First, 3:2–8 is clearly structured in terms of binary pairs, which in every case present mutually exclusive
opposites. Since a similar A-B structure also marks 1:4–7, this fact alone provides some clue that the two passages may share a conceptual link and should
perhaps be read similarly.31 Second, the poem of 3:2–8 is directly followed by
29
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There are a few readings of Qoheleth’s cyclicality theme, particularly in 1:4–11, that understand him as regarding it positively. For example, Lohfink, Qoheleth, 40, says that the
poem implies nothing negative but only “praises the cosmos as glorious and eternal in
this image of cyclic return.” Similarly, Dell, “Cycle,” 189, commenting on “the cycle of life
as controlled by God” and “the cycles in the natural world,” writes, “There is a positive
aspect to the simple description of the interaction with the natural world that cheers
the human spirit […]. The author displays […] an appreciation of the circularity of the
process.” And Knopf, “Optimism,” suggests that the thrust of Qoheleth’s cyclical language
is “the inevitable law and rationale of our world.” (198). But these readings, in fact, miss
the point. Readers may deduce that repeating phenomena are orderly, and that order is
good. But this is not the conclusion Qoheleth draws from these phenomena. Features of
the natural world such as order or consistency are little valued by the sage if they do not
result in gain for human beings. Given that Qoheleth frames 1:4–11 in relation to the question concerning gain in 1:3, the poem’s declaration of the world’s gainless, cyclical nature
is the direct, negative answer to that question and the passage’s central point.
Other commentators who read 1:3–11 and 3:2–8 (or 3:1–15) as connected and mutually
interpretive include Krüger, Qoheleth, 75–76; Enns, Ecclesiastes, 52; McNeile, Ecclesiastes,
15; Gese, “Crisis,” 147–148; Kaiser, “Qoheleth,” 86.
Several scholars have noted the importance of opposites for Qoheleth (either in this pair
of passages, or more broadly), e.g., Perry, Ecclesiastes, 84: “What both [1:3–11 and 3:2–8]
have in common, at a deeper structural level, is neither the ‘time’ nor the particular
desire or khepets […] but the perspective of a totality composed of opposites.” Horton,
“Koheleth’s Concept,” finds Qoheleth’s “doctrine of opposites” throughout the book,
positing that the sage “assumes that reality occurs in pairs” and “argues for the diverse
and contradictory nature of existence” in which “nature provides life and death, war and
peace, patience and anger, as well as good luck and misfortune.” Scott, Ecclesiastes, 235,
too, summarizes: “Everything has its opposite (cf. 3:1–8), so that man must not count on
the continuance of either good or bad fortune.”

the same rhetorical question which introduced the poem of 1:4–11: “What lasting gain is there for a person (‘worker’ in 3:9) in (all) his toil?”
1:3 ל־ע ָמלֹו ֶשׁיַּ ֲעמֹל ַתּ ַחת ַה ָשּׁ ֶמשׁ
ֲ ְבּ ָכ
אָדם
ָ ַמה־יִּ ְתרֹון ָל
3:9
עֹושׂה ַבּ ֲא ֶשׁר הוּא ָע ֵמל
ֶ ַמה־יִּ ְתרֹון ָה
1:3

What lasting gain is there for a person
in all his toil which
he toils under the sun?
3:9 What lasting gain is there for the worker in what
he toils?
Third, the subsequent verse (3:10) virtually repeats a sentence which had followed closely after the conclusion of the poem in 1:4–11, concerning the “business” God has given humans.
1:13 אָדם ַל ֲענֹות בֹּו
ָ ֹלהים ִל ְבנֵ י ָה
ִ נָ ַתן ֱא
3:10 אָדם ַל ֲענֹות בֹּו
ָ ֹלהים ִל ְבנֵ י ָה
ִ נָ ַתן ֱא
1:13 It is a bad
business
with
3:10 I have seen the business
with

ָרע
הוּא ִענְ יַ ן
ת־ה ִענְ יָ ן ֲא ֶשׁר
ָ יתי ֶא
ִ ָר ִא

that God has given humans to be busy
that God has given humans to be busy

This means that some of Qoheleth’s most immediate interpretive comments
on the book’s opening poem likewise comprise his commentary of the second
poem. If the immediately adjacent comments on each passage are nearly identical, this would seem a strong indicator that the content and overall meaning
of the two poems is regarded similarly by Qoheleth. Thus, if the subject matter
of the first poem is that of the cycles and repetition in earthly existence, we
might well expect this same essential message in the second poem. Fourth and
finally, the fact that 1:4–11 and 3:2–8 represent two of the book’s three poems
(the third being 12:1–7) and that 1:3–11 opens and 3:1–15 concludes the book’s
opening core unit (1:3–3:15) are further indicators that the two poems ought to
be mutually interpreted.32
32

See Kaiser, “Qoheleth,” 84: “Only in 1:3–3:15 do we find what is obviously a carefully planned
composition.” Michel, Untersuchungen, 1–83, and Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism,
44–76, regard 1:3–3:15 as a kind of overture of Qoheleth’s main ideas. Krüger, Qoheleth, 5,
notes that the book’s primary opening unit (1:12–2:26) is flanked by poems (1:3–11; 3:1–9,
in his divisions) which both either begin or end with the question concerning “gain” for
human beings.

If we are correct to read 3:2–8 in light of 1:4–11, then the following features
emerge as significant. When Qoheleth says that “there is a time for [A] and
a time for [B],” the emphasis lies not on the precise timing at which A or B
occurs—whether chosen by the astute individual or ordained by God—but
on the fact that the opposite realities of both A and B will inevitably occur,
not just one or the other.33 That two opposing realities will always (sooner or
later) manifest themselves implies that embedded into the created order itself
is a kind of equilibrating tendency, a drive toward “zero.” This homogenizing
proclivity naturally prompts the question of 3:9, “What gain?” Further, just as
in 1:4–11, what is implied in 3:2–8 is not only that A happens and then B (its
opposite) happens [A → B], but additionally, the constant oscillation between
A and B [A → B → A].34 There is a cyclicality intrinsic to everything done under
the sun such that human activity in any given sphere continually oscillates
between two poles. To expand on two of Qoheleth’s own examples: People
plant in the spring but inevitably uproot in the fall. Spring will come again
soon enough, though, and round it goes. People laugh with joy at the baby’s
birth but weep with mourning at the elder’s funeral days later. Yet laughing will
reprise in due course. This is the way the world turns. This is the nature of time
as humans experience it.35
We should note, too, that in 1:4–11 Qoheleth’s concern is neither ethical
(in the sense of the “proper times” reading of 3:2–8) nor determinist (as
though the main point were to convey God’s temporal preordination of the
movements in the natural world). Rather, the emphasis in 1:4–11 is merely
descriptive—this cyclical manner is the way the world works—and the sage’s
33
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Similarly, Barbour, Story of Israel, 54–76, stresses that in the poem “everything happens”
(56): “Qohelet’s times […] are not primarily ‘right’ times, but simply times when something happens” (55). I concur with Barbour that the point is more that all these things
happen than precisely when they happen, but our interpretations differ in that Barbour
would still plot the events of 3:2–8 along a linear timeline (“they are different points on a
temporal continuum […] the variety of human experience as a linear series of times […],”
57), whereas I see them as occurrences on polar ends of the oscillating cycles. Cf. Loader,
Polar Structures, 30.
There are other ancient Jewish texts in which the notion of binary opposites is emphasized, and in some it is spoken of in terms of sequence, one following after the other.
See T.Ash. 1:3–4; 5:1–2; Sir 18:25; 33:14–15. The closest parallel to Eccl 3:2–8 may be
Sir 34:28–31, which emphasizes that opposite actions undermine each other and result in
gainlessness (though Sirach’s concern is particularly with the efficacy of piety).
A few commentators have characterized 3:2–8 as cyclical (often, but not always, connecting it back to 1:4–11), even if this element has not received the strongest accent in their
interpretation. Cf. Barton, Ecclesiastes, 98; Jarick, “Hebrew Book of Changes,” 91; Wright,
Koheleth, 342; Scott, Ecclesiastes, 221; Hankins, “Internal Infinite,” 46–47; Dell, “Cycle,” 187;
Bundvad, Time, 91.

negative evaluation of this description is inferred by Qoheleth’s comments
immediately leading into (“What gain is there for a person […]?” [1:3]) and following the poem (“It is a bad business […]” [1:13]). Thus the same is arguably
true for the poem in 3:2–8. In this latter case, Qoheleth’s negative evaluation of
the poem’s content becomes clear in 3:9–15.

4

Support from Eccl 3:9–15

(9) What lasting gain is there for the worker in that which he toils?
(10) I have seen the business that God has given to humans to be busy with.
(11) He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has, moreover,
set the desire for perpetuity36 in their hearts, yet without any ability
for humanity to discover the work that God has done from beginning
to end. (12) I realized that there is nothing good for them except to be
joyful and to do what is worthwhile in one’s life. (13) Moreover, every
person who eats and drinks and sees good in all his toil—this is God’s
payment. (14) I know that all that God does—it remains forever; upon it
nothing can be added, and from it nothing can be taken away.37 God has
acted so that people might fear before him.

36
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The well-worn scholarly debate concerning that which God has placed into human
hearts—— ָהע ָֹלםhas produced a range of interpretive options: (a) “eternity” (LXX (αἰῶνα);
McNeile; Lohfink; Seow; Schoors; Weeks); (b) “world” (Vulgate mundum); (c) “ignorance,”
“darkness,” “obscurity,” derived from either DCH’s  עלםI, “to hide” (as in Eccl 12:14) or עלם
II, “to be dark” (Crenshaw; Frydrych; Scott; Barton; Plumptre); (d) “toil,” derived from
amending  ע ָֹלםto ( ָע ָמלFox; Ginsburg), inter alia. I have taken it in a sense closest to (a),
but I share with others the concern that “eternity” imports a Western philosophical and
theological category likely foreign to Qoheleth’s thought. Rather, I regard the idea here
that humans desire a long-term telos to work toward and such an accomplishment would
ensure them an enduring name for posterity. This notion, found elsewhere in the book, is
apparently compressed into the single word,  ָהע ָֹלם, and I have tried to capture this with
“perpetuity” (cf. Krüger, Qoheleth, 80, “distant time”), though “desire for” has been added
to communicate the assumed sense.
As elsewhere in later biblical Hebrew,  אַיִ ןfollowed by an infinitive construct may express
impossibility (“nothing can”) rather than mere negation (“nothing is”). See Esth 4:2; 8:8;
Ezra 9:15; Ps 40:6.

(15) Whatever has been—it already was.38
And whatever will be—it already has been.
And God seeks to do what has already been pursued.
Eccl 3:9–15

It is virtually unanimous among commentators that 3:9–15 represents Qoheleth’s
commentary on the poem of 3:2–8, a “philosophische Zusammenfassung.”39
Thus if our reading of the poem’s meaning is on track, we should expect support from 3:9–15 as well. We will now walk through 3:9–15, noting several ways
in which these verses do in fact support the present argument.
Beginning with 3:9, we have already noted the close parallel between 1:3 and
3:9. The only notable difference between them is the identification of the toiler
here as “the worker” (עֹושׂה
ֶ  ) ָהrather than the more generic אָדם
ָ , and this itself
is significant for our argument. Why would Qoheleth describe the activities in
3:2–8 as the “toil” of a “worker”? Our answer depends on connecting the use
of this word to v. 10. Here too we have just seen the tight parallel between 1:13
and 3:10. The “business” (or “job,” “task”;  ) ִענְ יַ ןgiven to humanity is identified as
“bad” ( ) ָרעin 1:13, and there is no reason to think it has escaped that characterization two chapters later. In 3:9–10 Qoheleth has thus proceeded from a poem
describing twenty-eight human activities to a characterization of the human
predicament in terms of the “worker” who “toils” and the “business” given to
people “to be busy with.” We may conclude from this prevalence of “business”oriented language following the poem that 3:9–10 serves to summarize 3:2–8 as
something like the “job description” allotted to humankind.
38
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Holmstedt and Jones, “Tripartite Verbless Clauses,” identify the  הוּאin ה־שּׁ ָהיָ ה ְכּ ָבר הוּא
ֶ ַמ
as one of many instances of a tripartite verbless (or nominal) clause in the HB where “the
pronoun […] should be read as the resumption pronoun in a dislocation,” as opposed to
other cases of the construction in which they identify the pronoun as a copula. As an
instance of left-dislocation (a term from linguistics), 3:15a has the structure, “X—it is Y”
(cf. also 1:9; 2:23; 3:21; 4:8; 5:18; 6:2). But 3:15a is particularly unique in that there is no Y
component (no predicate nominative). Instead, Qoheleth’s stress is on the “( ְכּ ָברalready”),
which adverbially modifies an implicit copula, hence “already was.” The implicit copula
is rendered past tense by its pairing with  ְכּ ָברand due to context. Another unique aspect
to this text is the word order—in such a case  הוּאshould normally precede  ְכּ ָבר. But in
both of the first two stiches of the verse  ְכּ ָברis focus-fronted (another linguistics term).
In their commentary, Holmstedt et al., Qoheleth, translate 3:15a, “Whatever is—it was
already,” which is congruent with my own rendering. As with 1:9–10 and 3:15b, Qoheleth
is contrasting two periods of time and stating that the occurrences of the later period
(whether, from Qoheleth’s point of view, they are past, present, or future) are always only
repetitions of what had already occurred before them.
Schellenberg, Kohelet, 74.

Furthermore, the common determinist reading of 3:2–8 claims that the lack
of gain Qoheleth identifies in 3:9 is owing purely to God’s predetermination of
all human actions. Yet, since 3:9 is a clear echo of 1:3 it is reasonable to assume
that the lack of gain in 3:9 relates closely to the same lack in 1:3. There the
statement introduces the poem of 1:4–11, and 1:4–11 says nothing concerning
God’s determination of events, emphasizing instead the cyclical nature of existence. Thus the complaint concerning lack of gain in 3:9 is more sensibly read
as a response to the world’s cyclical, repetitive nature (as expressed in 3:2–8)
than as a consequence of hard determinism. What the discussion in 3:9–15
adds to 1:3–11 is the clarification that behind the cycles of existence stands a
“prime mover”—or better, “prime recycler”40—who has pushed the cycles into
motion. But it is foremost the cycles that elicit the response of  ַמה־יִּ ְתרֹון, not
strictly the notion of a determinist, interventionist deity.
The implications of this understanding are already significant for showing
how my proposed reading differs from the common determinist reading of
3:2–8. Qoheleth encourages us to think of humanity as employees of the divine
employer, the cosmic “CEO.” What does the CEO of a company “determine,”
with respect to the CEO’s employees? To take a familiar modern example, the
workers on Henry Ford’s factory assembly line presumably did not feel some
external, physical compulsion to move their hands in a particular direction
at a specific time, according to the behest of the man in charge. He was not
a puppet-master in that strictest sense. What Henry Ford did control was the
workers’ “job description”: he assigned their general (repetitive) task, and it was
theirs to carry out. I suggest that the case is similar with Qoheleth’s humanity
and their deity: God has determined the fates of humans only insofar as he has
assigned them the “task” (1:13; 3:10) of carrying out mutually counterproductive, gainless activities (3:2–8).
While the Ford example is meant only as a heuristic, further considerations
support the suggestion that Qoheleth viewed humanity’s relation to God
through an employer-worker model. First, some scholars have proposed that
Qoheleth is presented as a “businessman,” since a striking number of his favorite terms are commercial or economic terms: “( יִּ ְתרֹוןgain”), “( ֶח ְסרֹוןloss”), ָשׂ ָכר
(“wage, reward”), “( ֶח ְשׁבֹּוןaccounting”), “( מנהcount”), “( ֵח ֶלקshare”), “( ִענְ יָ ןtask,
business”), “( ָע ָמלtoil, labor”).41 Second, Stuart Weeks argues that another such
term,  ַמ ַתּת, can mean “payment” in a broader sense than its common translation,
40
41

Brown, Ecclesiastes, 45.
See Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 34–37, and Dahood, “Canaanite-Phoenician
Influence,” 30–52, 191–221, who lists twenty-nine commercial terms used in the book and
concludes, “the over-all picture delineated by Ecclesiastes suggests a distinctly commercial environment” (220–221). Cf. Kugel, “Qohelet and Money.”

“gift,” since “the Hebrew probably bears no implication that what is offered has
not been earned.”42 Thus the rendering, “this is God’s payment,” in 3:13 would
cohere well with the business metaphor we have already seen in 3:9–10. The
divine CEO may employ unwitting laborers to carry out his bidding, but they
are not unpaid slaves—they are hired servants. They may not reap the desired
“lasting gain,” but he does at least grant his employees a wage. Third, as is well
known, several other ancient Near Eastern texts present humanity as created
to labor for the gods (e.g., Enuma Elish, the Atrahasis Epic, Enki and Ninmah,
Song of the Hoe, KAR 4). So it is not unreasonable that Qoheleth would have
viewed humanity similarly—at least as God’s “workers,” if not slaves.
Proceeding to 3:14, this verse elicits two main questions: (a) What is the referent for “all that God does” (ֹלהים
ִ ל־א ֶשׁר יַ ֲע ֶשׂה ָה ֱא
ֲ ( ?) ָכּb) What does it mean
that it “will be forever” (עֹולם
ָ  )יִ ְהיֶ ה ְלand that there can be no “adding to it”
(הֹוסיף
ִ  ) ָע ָליו ֵאין ְלnor “subtracting from it” (וּמ ֶמּנּוּ ֵאין ִלגְ ר ַֹע
ִ )? Regarding the first,
determinist readings of the book often assume that God’s  עשׂהrefers to an act
of divine determination concerning various human events—God’s “will” or
“plan”—which is then subsequently enacted in the human sphere.43 In reference to the activities listed in 3:2–8, then, “there is a time for planting” would
mean something like, “God has preordained that Joe will plant at 8:22am on
May 7th, 1978,” and innumerable other such instances. As a universalized doctrine, the claim is that God determines every specific activity on the part of
every person for all time.44 But, as I suggested earlier, this is far too expansive
an idea to import into the poem’s relatively bridled phrasing, especially when
a much simpler hypothesis is possible. Apart from the two abstract nouns at
the poem’s end, the activities listed in 3:2–8 are comprised of infinitive constructs, the most abstract grammatical form for identifying a verbal activity.
All concrete details normally included with a finite verb, such as the subject,
42
43
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Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 73, referencing Sir 42:7; 1 Kgs 13:7; Prov 25:14; Ezek 46:5,
11.
E.g., Ginsburg, Coheleth, 312, comments on 3:14, “all the affairs of human life alluded to
[in 3:1–9], which God has preordained are immutably fixed, that no ingenuity or industry […] can affect it in the slightest degree” and posits that  עשׂהhere carries the sense,
“to appoint, to ordain, to fix.” Similarly, Garrett, Ecclesiastes, 300, “no one can thwart or
change God’s will”; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 123, “no one can change God’s plan.”
E.g., Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15,” 62, believes that 3:14 refers to “the divine act by
which God has predisposed everything to happen at certain times and in certain ways,”
and that “Qoheleth probably has in mind written decrees, tablets of destiny, on which the
events of a human life are inscribed in advance and by which they are divinely predetermined.” Similarly, Ginsburg, Coheleth, 312: “The second lesson which Coheleth learned
from the facts described in 1–9 is, that all the affairs of human life alluded to, which God
has preordained, are immutably fixed, that no ingenuity or industry, however great, can
affect it in the slightest degree” (emphasis original).

tense (timing), mood, and aspect are left completely unstated. On my reading, Qoheleth’s choice of the infinitive construct is fitting since the poem is
merely stating that the named activities do inevitably occur, and occur cyclically at that, as part and parcel of the general human “job description” assigned
by God. When, how, and by whom specific actions come to be performed are
not the questions Qoheleth—nor Qoheleth’s deity—finds relevant. God’s עשׂה,
then, is simply the assigning and maintaining of this broad human task. If this
is correct, then the poem is hardly an ode to the sort of hard determinism so
commonly presumed. What has been determined is not a specific timing, but
a general task.
As for the second question, Qoheleth says that “all that God does—it will be
forever” (עֹולם
ָ ֹלהים הוּא יִ ְהיֶ ה ְל
ִ ל־א ֶשׁר יַ ֲע ֶשׂה ָה ֱא
ֲ  ָכּ,) and the denial that there is any
“adding to it” (הֹוסיף
ִ  ) ָע ָליו ֵאין ְלor “subtracting from it” (וּמ ֶמּנּוּ ֵאין ִלגְ ר ַֹע
ִ ) rules out
the possibility that any human agent could change what is divinely wrought.
But the “it” ( )הוּאcan be construed in two different ways, according to the two
versions of “determinism” on offer. On the common view, it is God’s foreordained decision about a specific future event (such as, again, “Joe will plant at
8:22am on May 7th, 1978”—or the universal collection of all such events across
time) that is deemed eternal and immutable. The meaning of 3:14 would be
that what God decides with respect to those events remains true forever—it is
a settled choice and will definitely happen. But on the reading I am proposing,
it is not God’s decision about future actions which is deemed unchangeable,
but the actions themselves—the cyclical and therefore ultimately unchanging
activities which typify human existence (3:2–8).45 Qoheleth’s use of a verb of
action, עשׂה, rather than a verb for deciding, combined with the verb’s imperfect form ()יַ ֲע ֶשׂה, argues for the latter option. Qoheleth is saying that what
God does, the state of affairs he establishes and maintains (which itself entails
human action), remains in place indefinitely. Despite the constant motion and
alternations, the lack of forward movement implies a situation that ultimately
remains the same. As we will see, the next verse fully supports this reading,
whereas it fails to comport with a reading of v. 14 concerned with foreordained decisions.
Finally, then, we come to 3:15. I have translated the first two clauses as,
“Whatever has been—it already was. And whatever will be—it already has
been.” The allusion to 1:9 is clear, and the alignments below represent the division of time shared between 1:9–10 and 3:15.
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Similarly Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 35: “It is worth noting that Qoheleth is speaking of the
immutability of the divine deed, not word” (emphasis original).

Distant
past

ְכּ ָבר ָהיָ ה
ְלע ָֹל ִמים

Future

Recent pasta

ה־שּׁ ָהיָ ה = הוּא ֶשׁיִּ ְהיֶ ה
ֶ ַמ
= (ח ָדשׁ) הוּא
ָ

Distant
past
1:9
1:10

Recent
past

Future

ְכּ ָבר הוּא
= ה־שּׁ ָהיָ ה
ֶ ַמ
b= ְכּ ָבר ָהיָ ה
ֲא ֶשׁר
ִל ְהיֹות

3:15a
3:15b

a Just as with the English use of the perfect tense, in many cases the Hebrew perfect tense includes
both the (recent) past and the present, thus ה־שּׁ ָהיָ ה
ֶ  ַמ, which I translated, “whatever has been,” is
often translated “whatever is.” See Isaksson, Studies, 50; Schoors, “hāyâ.”
b It is also possible that  ְכּ ָבר ָהיָ הwould function here as “recent past” and could be translated with
“is” (so Isaksson, Studies, 29), but in either case it is the “already,” the antecedency with respect to
 ֲא ֶשׁר ִל ְהיֹות, that is stressed.

Qoheleth had concluded the poem in 1:4–11 by asserting through abstract
temporal use of  היהthe cyclical nature of the world he had previously conveyed by natural imagery (1:5–7). Now in 3:15, closing out the section which
began with twenty-eight concrete examples of human activities, he once again
employs  היהto construct temporal phrases only slightly modified from those
in 1:9–10. The effect, as in 1:9–10, is to equate the events of disparate eras and
thereby strike the clear note of cyclicality. In both cases he has clarified and
generalized with abstract propositions what had previously come in the form
of poetic concreteness: that there is nothing new, that whatever should happen in the future can only reiterate past events. A further connection between
the two passages is that 1:9 and 3:15 both begin with ה־שּׁ ָהיָ ה
ֶ  ַמ, “whatever has
been.” In 3:15 this phrase means essentially, “Take any example from the list
just provided—whether planting, uprooting, crying, laughing, or any other.
Whatever given activity you pick, that same activity (and its opposite, its subversion) has already been done before and will be done again.” The parallels
between 1:9 and 3:15 are hardly coincidental, and most commentators recognize them. What is surprising, however, is how little the cyclicality of 3:15 is
taken into account with regard to the interpretation of 3:1–15 more broadly.
Many commentators betray a certain unease here and either seem to avoid
situating the verse within a “proper times” or determinist reading of the wider
passage or else do so in too simplistic a manner.46 But the point about cyclicality is more central to Qoheleth’s thought in 3:1–15 than is typically recognized.
Any interpretation of the passage must reckon with its implications.
46

Rudman’s treatment of the verse (Determinism, 93–94) is one such example, offering little
more than that “all is controlled by God.”

Moving to the latter part of the verse (3:15b), on an initial reading the final
clause, ֹלהים ַיְב ֵקּשׁ ֶאת־נִ ְר ָדּף
ִ וְ ָה ֱא, seems entirely out of place. Literal translations
such as the RSV render the line, “God seeks what has been driven away,” or the
like, but that leaves ambiguous its meaning in context. Several ancient versions
and older commentaries often find here a reference to God helping those who
are on the societal periphery (taking  נִ ְר ָדּףas “persecuted”),47 but as Plumptre
reports, this “introduces an idea quite foreign to the train of thought.”48 This
final line of the unit of 3:1–15 is, in fact, climactic. That is because it coalesces
the two strands of cyclicality and determinism in a way that had previously
been implied but not yet made explicit.49 What has been “driven away”—or
better, “pursued”—is none other than the events of the past. In saying that
God “seeks” them, Qoheleth means that God seeks to bring them back around,
to repeat them.50 The verse is climactic in that even though the cyclical theme
appears as early as 1:4–11, it is only here in 3:15 that Qoheleth explicitly identifies
God as its catalyst and sustainer. The world’s cyclical nature is not due merely
to impersonal forces; it has been established by God, and he is the one who
keeps the circle revolving. Again and again he pushes the “merry-go-round”
of human existence around for yet another spin. It is in this way, by means of
ordaining and propelling the cycles of time, rather than through the ad hoc
control of minute events or human actions, that Qoheleth’s deity exercises
his sovereignty.51 Yet in his role as the propagator of cycles, Qoheleth thinks
of God as the great “underminer.” Where humans believe themselves to be
running along a marathon track headed toward a finish line, God has quietly
placed a treadmill under their feet, so that they end up going nowhere, making
no progress.

5

Ecclesiastes 3:2–8 as Gainless Activity

Returning to Eccl 3:2–8, I suggest that in the context of the book of Qoheleth the
underlying claim of the “times” poem concerns neither an admonition to act
47
48
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See LXX, Targum, Peshitta, Sir 5:3 (possible allusion), Hengstenberg, Ecclesiastes, 111–112.
Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 134.
So Holmstedt et al., Qoheleth, 134.
So Krüger, Qoheleth, 90; Wright, Koheleth, 345; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 103; Tyler, Ecclesiastes,
90; McNeile, Ecclesiastes, 63; Gordis, Koheleth, 234; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15,”
62–63; Pfeiffer, “Peculiar Skepticism,” 107; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 100. Cf. Vulgate, et Deus
instaurat quod abiit (“and God restores what has passed”).
Similarly Fox, Contradictions, 195: “The events God brings to pass steamroller over whatever man can do, so nothing new can interrupt the awesome cycles of events that God has
ordained.”

at the proper time nor a pronouncement about God’s determination of every
human action. Rather, the poem primarily demonstrates humanity’s inability
to achieve יִ ְתרֹון, a meaningful telos.52 Human lives are filled with activity, running this way and that, seeking and losing, laughing and crying. Yet, much like
the cyclical movements of nature described in 1:5–7, it is activity whose bipolar
nature ultimately undermines itself and thus allows no forward progress. This
assignment of gainless activity is, for Qoheleth, the “bad business” that God
has given humans.
It is sometimes posited that one side of each of the poem’s antithetical pairs
[A] represents what is “good” or “desirable” and the opposite side [B] represents what is “bad” or “undesirable.”53 While in some cases the two sides of
a given pair might intuitively divide into positive and negative values (e.g.,
“being born” vs. “dying”, “mourning” vs. “dancing”), in many cases it is far from
obvious which of the two actions would represent a more positive or negative
value in relation to the other (e.g., “planting” vs. “uprooting,” “throwing stones”
vs. “gathering stones,” “keeping silent” vs. “speaking”). Rather than assume
that the division between positive and negative value runs through each pair,
I propose that what Qoheleth finds problematic and what elicits the question
“What gain?” in 3:9 is not the activity of one side or the other in itself, but simply the fact that the two activities bear opposite intentions or directions and
therefore cancel one another out.54
In the parallel passage of 1:4–7, it is not that one side of the pole is undesirable in relation to the other—there is nothing troublesome, for instance, about
the sun’s rising or setting in itself, nor the wind’s southward or northward blowing. What Qoheleth deems problematic about these circumstances is that the
oscillatory movement incessantly undermines itself, thereby canceling out
any יִ ְתרֹון, any “profit” or “surplus,” any achievement of something “new.”55 The
same applies to the pairs in 3:2–8. We need not assign each action as “desirable”
or “undesirable” simpliciter. It is enough that as recurring alternates they can
52
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An understanding of  יִ ְתרֹוןas the final goal toward which one’s toil ( ) ָע ָמלis aimed emerges
from the usage in 1:3; 2:11; 3:9; 5:15; cf. יֹותר
ֵ in 6:7–8a.
See Loader’s complex chiastic structure in Loader, “Sonnet,” followed by Wright, “For
Everything”; Jarick, “Hebrew Book of Changes.”
Horton, “Koheleth’s Concept,” 6, refers here to a “‘principle of cancellation,’ wherein two
events take place, but the one cancels the other.” Cf. Frydrych, Under the Sun, 43–46;
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 96.
Similarly Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15,” 61: “In a word, the basic issue for Qoheleth
is whether these actions [in 3:2–8] can have some surplus value (yitrôn, profit) carrying
beyond the mere doing of them”; Good, Irony, 185: “Time too cancels out profit […]. Man’s
actions add up to nothing, each balanced by one from the other side. Hence, ironically, as
man acts responsibly with the deed appropriate to every present moment, he ensures that
he does not come out ahead.”
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arrive nowhere other than where they started. This lack of positive gain itself
is what Qoheleth deems undesirable.

6

Conclusion

Reality, Qoheleth believes, is regulated by its oscillatory nature; this mitigates
deep loss, but also withholds “lasting gain” ()יִ ְתרֹון. Whether or not Qoheleth
penned the poem in 3:2–8, his reading of it highlights the lack of gain for the
human “worker” carrying out his assigned activities under the divine employer.
The poem provides a panoply of the sorts of paired antithetical activities
human beings inevitably and repeatedly carry out, in which every “doing” gets
“undone.” Thus, despite its common associations, Qoheleth’s Catalogue of the
Times is not primarily a poem about timing, about when things ought to or
will happen. Rather, it is a poem about value, the value of the human task.
Regardless of their timing, all of the activities which typify human lives are
self-sabotaged by an equilibrating tendency which undermines any would-be
gains, arriving only back at “zero.”
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Köhlmoos, Melanie. Kohelet: Der Prediger Salomo. ATD 16.5. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 2015.
Krüger, Thomas. Qoheleth: A Commentary. Hermeneia 21. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004.
Kugel, James L. “Qohelet and Money.” CBQ 51 (1989): 32–49.
Lauha, Aarre. Kohelet. BKAT 19. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1978.
Loader, James A. Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet. BZAW 152. New York: de Gruyter,
1979.
Loader, James A. “Qohelet 3:2–8: A Sonnet in the Old Testament.” ZAW 81 (1969):
240–242.
Lohfink, Norbert. Qoheleth: A Continental Commentary. Translated by Sean E. McEvenue.
CC. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003.
Longman III, Tremper. The Book of Ecclesiastes. NICOT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997.
Loretz, Oswald. Qohelet und der alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und theologischer
Thematik des Buches Qohelet. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1964.
Machinist, Peter. “Fate, Miqreh, and Reason: Some Reflections on Qohelet and Biblical
Thought.” Pages 159–175 in Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic,
and Semitic Studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield. Edited by Ziony Zevit, Seymour
Gitin, and Michael Sokoloff. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1995.
McNeile, Alan H. An Introduction to Ecclesiastes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1904.
Merrill, Eugene H. Qumran and Predestination: A Theological Study of the Thanksgiving
Hymns. STDJ 8. Leiden: Brill, 1975.
Michel, Diethelm. Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet. BZAW 183. Berlin:
de Gruyter, 1989.
Murphy, Roland E. Ecclesiastes. WBC 23A. Dallas: Word, 1992.
Perdue, Leo G. Wisdom & Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature. Nashville:
Abingdon, 1994.

10.1163/15685330-bja10039 | Vetus Testamentum
(2021) 1–30
Downloaded from Brill.com12/02/2021 04:55:03AM
via free access

Times as Task, Not Timing

29

Perry, T.A. The Book of Ecclesiastes (Qohelet) and the Path to Joyous Living. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Pfeiffer, Robert H. “The Peculiar Skepticism of Ecclesiastes.” JBL 53 (1934): 100–109.
Plumptre, Edward H. Ecclesiastes or the Preacher. CBSC. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1881.
Popovic, Mladen. “Apocalyptic Determinism.” Pages 255–270 in The Oxford Handbook
of Apocalyptic Literature. Edited by John J. Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014.
von Rad, Gerhard. Wisdom in Israel. Nashville: Abingdon, 1972.
Rudman, Dominic. “Determinism and Anti-Determinism in the Book of Koheleth.” JBQ
30 (2002): 97–106.
Rudman, Dominic. Determinism in the Book of Ecclesiastes. Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic, 2001.
Schellenberg, Annette. Kohelet. ZBK 17. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2013.
Schoors, Antoon. Ecclesiastes. HCOT. Leuven: Peeters, 2013.
Schoors, Antoon. “The Verb hāyâ in Qoheleth.” Pages 229–238 in Shall Not the
Judge of All the Earth Do What is Right? Studies on the Nature of God in Tribute to
James L. Crenshaw. Edited by David Penchansky and Paul L. Redditt. Winona Lake,
IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000.
Schultz, Richard L. “A Sense of Timing: A Neglected Aspect of Qoheleth’s Wisdom.”
Pages 257–267 in Seeking Out the Wisdom of the Ancients. Essays Offered to Honor
Michael V. Fox on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday. Edited by Ronald L. Troxel,
Kelvin G. Friebel, and Dennis R. Magary. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005.
Scott, Robert B.Y. Proverbs, Ecclesiastes. AB 18. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
Seow, Choon-Leong. Ecclesiastes. AB 18C. New York: Doubleday, 1997.
Stauber, Chad Martin. “Determinism in the Rule of the Community (1QS): A New
Perspective.” Pages 345–358 in Celebrating the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Canadian
Contribution. Edited by Peter W. Flint, Jean Duhaime, and Kyung S. Baek. Atlanta:
SBL, 2011.
Tyler, Thomas. Ecclesiastes: A Contribution to Its Interpretation. London: Williams and
Norgate, 1874.
Weeks, Stuart. Introduction and Commentary on Ecclesiastes 1.1–5.6. Vol. 1 of A Critical
and Exegetical Commentary on Ecclesiastes. ICC. London: T&T Clark, 2020.
Weeks, Stuart. Ecclesiastes and Scepticism. HBOTS 541. New York: T&T Clark
International, 2012.
Whybray, R. Norman. Ecclesiastes. NCBC. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989.
Whybray, R. Norman. Ecclesiastes. OTG. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989.
Whybray, R. Norman. “Ecclesiastes 1:5–7 and the Wonders of Nature.” JSOT 13 (1988):
105–112.

Vetus Testamentum (2021) 1–30 | 10.1163/15685330-bja10039
Downloaded from Brill.com12/02/2021 04:55:03AM
via free access

30

Peterson

Wildeboer, Gerrit. “Der Prediger.” Pages 109–168 in Die fünf Megillot (Das Hohelied,
Das Buch Ruth, Die Klagelieder, Der Prediger, Das Buch Esther). Edited by Karl Bude,
Alfred Bertholet, and Gerrit Wildeboer. KHC 17. Freiburg im Breisgau: J.C.B. Mohr,
1898.
Wright, Addison G. “‘For Everything There is a Season’: The Structure and Meaning
of the Fourteen Opposites (Ecclesiastes 3,2–8).” Pages 321–328 in De la Tôrah au
Messie: Études d’exégèse et d’herméneutique bibliques offertes à Henri Cazelles pour
ses 25 années d’enseignement à l’Institut Catholique de Paris (Octobre 1979). Edited by
Maurice Carrez, Joseph Doré, and Pierre Grelot. Paris: Desclée, 1981.
Wright, Charles H.H. The Book of Koheleth, Commonly Called Ecclesiastes. The
Donnellan Lectures. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.
Zimmerli, Walther. “Das Buch des Predigers Salomo.” Pages 123–253 in Sprüche, Prediger,
Das Hohe Lied, Klagelieder, Das Buch Esther. Translated and explained by Helmer
Ringgren, Walther Zimmerli, and Otto Kaiser. ATD 16. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1967.
Zimmerli, Walther. “The Place and Limit of Wisdom in the Framework of the
Old Testament Theology.” SJT 17 (1964): 146–158.

10.1163/15685330-bja10039 | Vetus Testamentum
(2021) 1–30
Downloaded from Brill.com12/02/2021 04:55:03AM
via free access

